THE  MILITARY  OBLIGATION 
OF  CITIZENSHIP 


BY 

LEONARD  WOOD 

Major-General  United  States  Army 


PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 
PRINCETON 

LONDON:  HUMPHREY  MILFORD 

OXFORD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

1915 


Copyright,  1915,  by 
PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

Published  November,  1915 


INTRODUCTION 

When  General  Wood  delivered  his  ad- 
dress in  Princeton  April  15,  1915,  on  the 
subject  of  "The  Policy  of  the  United 
States  in  Raising  and  Maintaining  Ar- 
mies," many  of  us  felt  that  his  words 
should  have  a  wider  circulation;  hence  this 
volume. 

To  the  Princeton  address  have  been 
added  two  other  addresses  by  General 
Wood.  The  first,  "The  Military  Obliga- 
tion of  Citizenship"  was  delivered  at  the 
Lake  Mohonk  Conference,  May  20,  1915. 
The  second,  "The  Civil  Obligation  of  the 
Army,"  was  delivered  at  St.  Paul's 
School,  June  15, 1915.  These  addresses  are 
here  reprinted  as  they  appeared  in  the 
press. 

iii 


324981 


iv  INTRODUCTION 

It  is  eminently  proper  that  the  Ameri- 
can people  should  give  especial  considera- 
tion to  the  opinion  of  General  Wood  on 
the  subject  of  military  preparedness.  We 
should  listen  to  him  with  particular  defer- 
ence because  of  his  intimate  knowledge  of 
our  army,  its  strength  and  its  weakness, 
and  because  in  the  event  of  war  he  is  the 
one  upon  whom  would  rest  the  heaviest 
weight  of  responsibility  to  defend  our 
homes  against  the  attack  of  an  invading 
enemy.  General  Wood  is  a  soldier,  and 
yet  a  man  of  peace.  He  hates  militarism 
but  believes  in  a  reasonable  preparedness 
and  naturally  shrinks  from  the  task  of  lead- 
ing forth  the  devoted  but  inexperienced 
young  men  of  our  land  to  be  slaughtered 
like  cattle  at  the  hands  of  experienced  and 
seasoned  troops.  He  desires  to  maintain 
peace  with  honor,  but  would  not  sacrifice 
honor  merely  for  the  sake  of  a  comfortable 
ease  and  security  of  peace.  He  is  deeply 


INTRODUCTION  v 

sensible  of  the  fact  that  no  amount  of  pa- 
triotic enthusiasm  will  compensate  for  the 
lack  of  military  knowledge,  and  that  in  the 
time  of  peril  the  ability  to  meet  the  crisis 
is  not  born  of  the  crisis  itself,  but  its  be- 
ginning and  development  must  antedate 
the  occasion  when  the  crucial  test  is  to  be 
met  and  withstood,  and  that  the  easy  going 
and  popular  idea  that  when  the  emergency 
comes  unknown  resources  will  be  discov- 
ered and  extraordinary  powers  suddenly 
evoked,  is  a  fallacy  as  silly  as  it  is  false, 
and  that  it  is  disastrous  to  attempt  to  learn 
the  art  of  war  in  the  midst  of  war  itself, 
because  war  is  the  time  for  action,  not  for 
education. 

General  Wood  commands  our  attention 
because  he  himself  has  done  more  than 
merely  talk  and  write  on  this  subject.  He 
has  begun  the  work  of  general  military 
education  through  the  summer  camps,  and 
has  attempted  with  extraordinary  success 


vl  INTRODUCTION 

this  intensive  training  of  our  young  men 
in  military  theory  and  practice. 

In  all  the  pursuits  of  professional  and 
business  life  we  have  formed  the  habit  of 
seeking  expert  knowledge.  General 
Wood  possesses  this  knowledge.  It  is 
available  in  this  volume.  Our  voters  and 
legislators  alike  should  seek  the  light 
where  it  is  shining.  It  does  not  require 
an  extraordinary  amount  of  wisdom  for 
a  man  to  profit  by  his  own  mistakes.  It 
is,  however,  the  supreme  test  of  wisdom 
and  the  proof  of  its  presence  and  power 
when  a  man  is  capable  of  profiting  by  the 
mistakes  of  others.  The  same  is  true  not 
only  of  the  individual,  but  of  any  particu- 
lar generation  of  people.  It  is  difficult 
for  those  who  live  in  the  present  to  under- 
stand and  profit  by  the  mistakes  of  the 
generations  before  them.  That  generation 
is  indeed  wise  that  can  so  interpret  the 
history  of  the  past  as  to  realize  the  signifi- 


INTRODUCTION  vii 

cance  of  disastrous  mistakes  due  to  ignor- 
ance and  indifference  and  thereby  avoid  a 
like  disaster  in  its  own  day. 

Let  us  as  a  nation  learn  the  lesson  of 
our  own  foolishness  so  that  we  may  not 
multiply  the  mistakes  or  repeat  the  folly 
of  those  who  have  gone  before  us. 

JOHN  GRIER  HIBBEN. 

Princeton,  N.  J. 
November  3,  1915 


CONTENTS 

I.  The  Policy  of  the  United  States 
in  Raising  and  Maintaining 
Armies 1 

II.  The  Military  Obligation  of  Citi- 
zenship       40 

III.  The    Civil    Obligation    of    the 

Army 50 


THE  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED 

STATES  IN  RAISING  AND 

MAINTAINING  ARMIES 

The  people  of  the  United  States  are  sin- 
gularly lacking  in  information  concerning 
both  the  military  history  of  their  country 
and  its  military  policy.  Students  in  school 
and  college  as  a  rule  receive  entirely  er- 
roneous ideas  on  both  of  these  subjects. 
The  average  young  man,  unless  he  has 
really  made  a  study  of  the  country's  his- 
tory, is  firmly  convinced  that  the  Revolu- 
tionary War  was  characterized  throughout 
by  the  highest  quality  of  patriotism  and 
devotion  to  the  best  interests  of  the  coun- 
try on  the  part  of  the  people  as  a  whole. 


2  RAISING  AND 

He  is  not  at  all  familiar  with  the  desperate 
struggle  which  was  made  by  Washington, 
various  Colonial  assemblies  and  the  Con- 
federation of  Colonies,  to  keep  in  the  field 
even  a  small  force  of  troops.  He  hears 
very  little  of  the  bickerings,  mutinies,  de- 
sertions and  frequent  changes  of  personnel 
which  made  the  war  a  difficult  one  to  con- 
duct and  served  to  bring  out  into  strong 
relief  the  remarkable  qualities  of  Wash- 
ington— those  qualities  of  patience,  good 
judgment,  discretion  and  again  patience, 
and  more  patience,  which  made  it  possible 
for  him  to  hold  the  illy-equipped,  disjointed 
and  discordant  elements  together,  and  to 
have  always  available  some  kind  of  a  fight- 
ing force,  although  seldom  an  effective 
one. 

We  have  as  a  nation  neglected  the 
lessons  of  past  wars,  and  have  learned 
little  from  the  example  of  the  great  mili- 
tary nations,  and,  as  Emory  Upton  truth- 


MAINTAINING  ARMIES  3 

fully  says:  "Our  general  policy  has  fol- 
lowed closely  that  of  China."  Perhaps 
this  statement  may  be  somewhat  extreme 
in  all  which  applies  to  conditions  up  to  the 
end  of  the  Civil  War,  but  it  is  not  in  any 
way  extreme  when  applied  to  conditions 
which  exist  today.  The  great  nations 
with  policies  to  uphold  and  interests  to 
defend  have  made  what  they  believe  to  be 
adequate  military  preparation. 

The  United  States  has  been  drifting  for 
years.  No  real  military  preparations  of 
an  adequate  character  have  been  made. 
Military  preparedness  means  the  organi- 
zation of  all  the  resources  of  a  nation — 
men,  material  and  money — so  that  the  full 
power  of  the  nation  may  be  promptly 
applied  and  continued  at  maximum 
strength  for  a  considerable  period  of  time. 
War  today,  when  initiated  by  a  country 
prepared  for  war,  comes  with  great  sud- 
denness, because  all  preparations  have 


4  RAISING  AND 

been  made  in  advance;  plans  have  been 
worked  out  to  the  last  detail,  organization 
completed  and  reserve  supplies  purchased 
and  assembled  long  in  advance  and  the 
whole  force  of  the  mighty  machine  can  be 
applied  in  a  very  brief  period  of  time  at 
any  designated  point. 

Back  of  the  machine  itself  is  the  railroad 
service,  so  organized  as  to  be  turned  over 
immediately  to  the  military  authorities. 
Back  of  this  come  the  civil  hospitals,  the 
bakeries,  and  the  supply  departments  of 
all  sorts,  each  with  its  responsibility  fixed 
in  case  of  operations  within  its  area,  or  in 
case  of  a  demand  for  supplies  in  other  sec- 
tions of  the  theatre  of  war.  The  capacity 
of  every  ship  is  known,  and  plans  com- 
pleted for  her  use  as  a  troop  ship,  and 
when  war  threatens,  the  whereabouts  of 
the  shipping  is  closely  watched,  and 
ships  are  assembled  quietly  to  meet  any 
demand  which  may  be  required  for  over- 


MAINTAINING  ARMIES  5 

sea  operations.  These  are  but  an  outline 
of  what  is  meant  by  military  preparedness. 

Mere  numbers  of  men  and  undevel- 
oped military  resources  are  of  little  value. 
It  has  been  well  said  that  in  the  sudden 
onrush  of  modern  war,  undeveloped  mili- 
tary resources  are  of  no  more  use  than  an 
undeveloped  gold  mine  in  Alaska  would 
be  in  a  panic  on  Wall  Street.  The  com- 
parison is  not  overdrawn.  You  must  re- 
member, all  of  you,  that  this  country  has 
never  yet  engaged  in  war  with  a  first-class 
Power  prepared  for  war. 

You  must  remember  also  that  once  sea 
power  is  lost  or  held  in  check  an  enormous 
force  can  be  landed  on  these  shores  within 
a  month — a  force  sufficient  to  go  where  it 
will  and  to  hold  whatever  it  desires  to  hold. 

Why  have  we  failed  to  make  adequate 
preparation  ?  Partly  because  of  ignorance 
of  the  true  facts  concerning  our  utter  un- 
preparedness,  and  partly  due  to  a  conceit 


6  RAISING  AND 

fostered  by  the  average  Fourth  of  July 
orator  and  politician,  through  statements 
to  the  effect  that  we  possess  peculiar  and 
remarkable  military  characteristics  which 
make  our  soldiers  trained  and  efficient 
without  preparation,  and  as  good  as 
equally  brave  and  equally  sound  men  of 
other  countries  who  have  spent  years  in 
training.  Again  there  is  the  curious  An- 
glo-Saxon prejudice  against  a  large 
standing  army  and  the  feeling  that  it  is 
always  a  menace  to  civil  liberty. 

In  our  past  wars  we  were  not  confronted 
by  great  nations  with  highly  organized 
military  machines;  steam  navigation  had 
not  appeared;  our  possible  enemies  were 
without  standing  armies  of  any  size,  and 
lacked  entirely  that  complete  military  or- 
ganization which  characterizes  them  today. 
It  took  a  long  time  to  get  troops  together 
and  prepare  supplies  for  them,  and  a  con- 
siderable period  of  time  to  cross  the  ocean. 


MAINTAINING  ARMIES  7 

Our  forefathers  had  more  time  to  prepare. 
Then,  again,  they  were  more  familiar  with 
the  use  of  arms ;  weapons  were  of  a  simple 
type;  they  could  be  made  quickly,  and 
instruction  in  their  use  was  a  relatively 
simple  matter. 

Now  highly  organized  military  estab- 
lishments are  the  rule  among  our  possible 
antagonists.  Rapid  steam  transportation 
in  vast  amount  is  available.  The  arms  of 
war  are  extremely  complicated  and  costly : 
it  takes  a  long  time  to  make  them  and  a 
long  time  to  instruct  soldiers  in  their  use. 
In  other  words,  today  everything  is  in 
favor  of  the  prepared  aggressor  and 
everything  against  the  unready  pacific 
nation. 

The  blow  comes  more  quickly  and  with 
greater  force,  and  it  is  not  possible  to 
provide  even  a  semblance  of  protection 
against  it  unless  wise  measures  have  been 
taken  long  in  advance. 


8  RAISING  AND 

Since  the  foundation  of  the  Republic, 
war  has  existed  as  follows : 

Revolutionary  War   7  years 

War  of  1812-14 2j  years 

Mexican  War 2  years 

Florida  War 7  years 

Civil  War 4  years 

War  with  Spain  and  Philippine 

Rebellion  2  years 

Not  to  mention  numerous  Indian  wars 
and  internal  disturbances  requiring  the 
use  of  troops. 

We  have  struggled  through  these  wars 
and  have  emerged  generally  successfully, 
but  in  none  of  them  has  there  been  any  evi- 
dence of  well-thought-out  preparations  or 
the  application  of  a  sound  military  policy. 
Our  people  remember  only  the  success  and 
forget  entirely  the  great  and  unnecessary 
cost  in  blood  and  treasure  in  which  our  de- 
fective method  of  conducting  these  wars 
resulted.  By  faulty  methods  I  mean  that 


MAINTAINING  ARMIES  9 

we  have  generally  conducted  war  as  a  con- 
federacy instead  of  as  a  nation.  We  have 
permitted  altogether  too  much  interference 
by  States.  Too  many  officers  have  been  ap- 
pointed by  the  Governors  of  States.  New 
regiments  have  been  raised  oftentimes  in 
order  that  new  officers  might  be  appointed 
and  political  patronage  increased,  where- 
as the  old  regiments  should  have  been 
filled  up,  as  they  had  acquired  experience, 
some  traditions  and  esprit,  and  were  much 
more  valuable  than  new  regiments.  This 
is  seen  in  the  Civil  War  in  case  of  the  Wis- 
consin organizations.  Wisconsin  had  the 
good  sense  to  veteranize  her  regiments, 
and  the  result  is  seen  when  one  remembers 
the  term  "Iron  Brigade"  applied  to  a 
Wisconsin  brigade. 

Then  again  we  have  had  frequently  the 
intervention  of  civilians,  either  through  the 
activities  of  the  Secretary  of  War  or  of 
the  civil  arms  of  the  Government.  There 


10  RAISING  AND 

has  been  a  general  lack  of  a  sense  of  in- 
dividual responsibility  for  military  ser- 
vice. Reliance  on  volunteer  enlistments 
has  continued,  and  has  been  one  of  the 
gravest  sources  of  danger  to  the  Republic. 
The  experience  of  the  Revolution  should 
have  taught  us  that  it  is  not  safe  in  a  real 
war  to  depend  upon  volunteers.  There  is 
an  enthusiastic  response  by  a  certain  pro- 
portion of  the  best  element  in  the  early 
days  of  war,  but  this  response  cannot  be 
counted  upon  to  continue  throughout  a 
long  war  involving  severe  strains  upon  the 
population,  nor  is  it  right  or  just  to  throw 
the  burden  of  military  service  upon  a  por- 
tion of  the  population.  It  is  a  universal 
obligation  and  the  country  will  never  be 
secure  or  safe  until  it  is  recognized  as  such 
and  measures  are  taken  to  develop  mili- 
tary preparation  on  a  basis  of  universal 
military  obligation. 

To  return  to  the  Revolution,  in  1774 


...•  .•  i 


v.:    •.... 


pel 


MAINTAINING  ARMIES  11 

Massachusetts  Colony  assembled  a  provi- 
sional congress,  and  began  preparations 
for  a  conflict  with  Great  Britain.  It  took 
steps  to  organize  a  militia  and  to  appoint 
officers.  The  movement  was  continued 
through  the  year  1775,  and  provision  was 
made  that  a  portion  of  the  militia  should 
be  Minute  Men — men  who  would  hold 
themselves  ready  to  respond  immediately 
to  call.  This  was  the  condition  when  the 
fight  at  Lexington  occurred.  Men  were 
commissioned  as  officers  largely  in  accor- 
dance with  the  number  of  men  they  raised. 
It  was  a  most  vicious  practice,  and  one 
which  has  persisted  until  recent  times. 
Popular  men,  regardless  of  their  military 
qualifications  or  fitness,  were  appointed 
to  commands  which  they  were  entirely  un- 
fitted to  exercise. 

In  May,  1775,  the  Continental  Con- 
gress met  (this  was  about  three  weeks 
after  the  battle  of  Lexington).  It  as- 


12  RAISING  AND 

sumed  immediately  the  functions  of  civil 
government,  but  being  without  authority 
to  levy  taxes  or  to  raise  revenue,  it  was 
empowered  to  emit  bills  of  credit,  their 
redemption  being  secured  by  the  promise 
of  the  twelve  Colonies.  This  limitation 
upon  its  financial  power  almost  neutralized 
its  power  to  create  and  support  armies. 
The  conduct  of  the  Revolutionary  War 
would  have  been  very  different  had  the 
Continental  Congress  had  the  power  to 
employ  the  entire  financial  and  military 
resources  of  the  people.  This  Congress 
authorized  the  formation  of  ten  companies 
of  riflemen,  and  these  companies  were 
really  the  beginning  of  the  Continental 
Army.  They  were  raised  from  Pennsyl- 
vania, Virginia  and  Maryland.  The  term 
of  enlistment  was  fixed  at  one  year.  There 
was  great  enthusiasm,  and  the  twelve 
companies  reported  within  sixty  days.  As 
was  natural  the  men  composing  these  com- 


MAINTAINING  ARMIES  13 

panics  were  among  the  best.  The  really 
best  men  are  those  who  first  rush  to  the 
colors. 

These  riflemen  were  the  nucleus  of  the 
army  which  finally  achieved  our  indepen- 
dence, and  maintained  a  high  reputation 
throughout  the  war.  The  term  of  enlist- 
ment, however,  was  short,  and  here  we  en- 
counter one  of  the  great  difficulties  which 
confronted  Washington  and  all  others 
throughout  the  Revolution;  namely,  the 
question  of  short  enlistments.  Men  were 
barely  trained  before  they  left  the  service 
to  be  replaced  by  others  untrained  and,  of 
course,  unequipped  and  generally  demand- 
ing new  uniforms  and  equipment.  Shortly 
after  the  authorization  of  these  companies 
of  riflemen  Congress  authorized  twenty- 
six  additional  regiments  to  be  raised  by 
the  different  colonies — sixteen  by  Mas- 
sachusetts. Blank  commissions  were  sent 
to  Washington.  With  the  arrival  of  these 


14  RAISING  AND 

blank  commissions  Washington's  troubles 
and  difficulties  were  greatly  augmented. 
A  tremendous  struggle  followed.  States 
attempted  to  secure  an  undue  proportion 
for  their  own  contingents. 

Washington's  letters  at  this  time  speak 
of  corruption,  lack  of  patriotism,  slow  en- 
listments, and  indicate  a  condition  which 
would  have  appalled  any  but  one  with  a 
stout  heart  and  determined  character. 

About  this  time  appeared  the  question 
of  "bounty" — one  of  the  most  dangerous 
and  pernicious  methods  of  securing  men. 
Washington  was  already  deeply  im- 
pressed with  the  danger  of  short  enlist- 
ments and  the  unreliability  of  the  Militia. 
He  was  also  alarmed  at  the  general  and 
widespread  evil  of  desertion.  Volunteer- 
ing had  already  become  slow.  Washington 
recommended  coercive  measures  to  the 
General  Court  of  Massachusetts  and 
urged — indeed  almost  prayed — Congress 


MAINTAINING  ARMIES  15 

to  establish  enlistments  for  the  war.  He 
already  saw  clearly  that  the  volunteer  sys- 
tem was  a  failure,  that  it  was  full  of  grave 
dangers  and  that  the  war  could  not  be  suc- 
cessfully conducted  by  untrained  men  led 
by  inefficient  officers. 

It  was  during  this  year — thanks  largely 
to  the  efforts  of  Washington — that  the 
Continental  Army  reached  its  maximum 
strength — the  greatest  that  it  had  during 
the  struggle.  At  its  maximum  it  totaled 
in  round  numbers  89,000  men,  of  whom 
49,000  were  Continentals  and  42,000  Mili- 
tia. Dictatorial  powers  were  given  to 
Washington  to  raise  troops  in  any  of  the 
Colonies,  seize  supplies  and  compel  accep- 
tance of  colonial  bills;  from  all  of  which 
it  is  clearly  evident  that  had  we  been  op- 
posed by  a  vigorous,  well  organized  enemy 
our  capacity  for  resistance  would  have 
been  comparatively  slight. 

The  British  campaign  was  not  pushed 


16  RAISING  AND 

with  great  energy.  From  the  high  water 
mark  of  89,000  the  Continental  Army 
shrunk  year  by  year.  In  1777  the  total  was 
69,000;  in  1778  it  had  dwindled  to  51,000, 
and  such  was  the  condition  of  the  diffi- 
culty as  to  enlistments  that  the  enlist- 
ment of  negro  slaves  was  authorized  by 
Rhode  Island — these  slaves  to  become  free 
on  enlistment. 

Congress  recommended  to  the  States 
the  employment  of  the  draft.  These  con- 
ditions grew  worse  in  1779.  Bounties  had 
to  be  greatly  increased  and  the  total  maxi- 
mum force  shrunk  to  44,000.  In  1780  the 
same  general  difficulties  continued.  The 
proportion  of  Continentals  to  Militia  had 
increased.  The  grand  total  was  about 
43,000,  of  whom  a  very  considerable  num- 
ber were  Militia  enlisted  for  short  periods. 
In  1781  (the  last  year  which  was  charac- 
terized by  active  fighting),  the  army  had 
dwindled  to  a  total  of  a  little  over  29,000 


MAINTAINING  ARMIES  17 

men ;  mutiny  took  place  among  the  troops 
of  the  Pennsylvania  line,  and  the  general 
condition  was  chaotic.  Had  we  been  con- 
fronted by  a  well  organized  enemy  and  a 
vigorous  campaign  waged  against  us, 
it  is  not  difficult  to  foresee  what  the 
outcome  must  have  been.  Bounties  had 
increased  enormously,  and  discipline  was 
poor  among  the  newly  raised  troops. 

No  one  who  has  studied  carefully  the 
situation  during  the  last  two  years  of  the 
Revolutionary  War  can  fail  to  appreciate 
the  tremendous  value  of  the  aid  which  was 
furnished  us  by  France.  It  was  of  vital 
importance  and  came  at  a  most  critical 
time.  The  haphazard  policy  followed 
throughout  the  Revolution  cost  tremen- 
dously in  life  and  treasure.  Years  after 
the  war  General  Lee  (known  as  Light- 
Horse  Harry  Lee)  characterized  our  mili- 
tary policy  as  follows: 

"While    I    record    with    delight    facts 


18  RAISING  AND 

which  maintain  our  native  and  national 
courage,  I  feel  a  horror  lest  demagogues 
who  flourish  in  a  representative  system  of 
government  (the  best  when  virtue  rules, 
the  wit  of  man  can  devise)  shall  avail 
themselves  of  the  occasional  testimony  to 
produce  a  great  result.  Convinced  as  I  am 
that  a  government  is  the  murderer  of  its 
citizens  which  sends  them  to  the  field  unin- 
formed and  untaught,  where  they  are  to 
meet  men  of  the  same  age  and  strength, 
mechanized  by  education  and  discipline 
for  battle,  I  cannot  withhold  my  denuncia- 
tion of  its  wickedness  and  folly." 

Washington's  criticism  of  our  military 
policy  was  none  the  less  strong.  He  says : 

"Had  we  formed  a  permanent  army  in 
the  beginning,  which,  by  the  continuance 
of  the  same  men  in  service,  had  been  capa- 
ble of  discipline,  we  should  never  have  had 
to  retreat  with  a  handful  of  men  across  the 
Delaware  in  1776  trembling  for  the  fate 


o 

0 

ls 


MAINTAINING  ARMIES  19 

of  America,  which  nothing  but  the  infatu- 
ation of  the  enemy  could  have  saved.  .  .  . 
We  should  not  have  been  the  greatest  part 
of  the  war  inferior  to  the  enemy,  indebted 
for  our  safety  to  their  inactivity,  enduring 
frequently  the  mortification  of  seeing  in- 
viting opportunities  to  ruin  them  pass  un- 
improved for  want  of  a  force  which  the 
country  was  completely  able  to  afford,  and 
of  seeing  the  country  ravaged,  our  towns 
burnt,  the  inhabitants  plundered,  abused, 
murdered,  with  impunity  from  the  same 
cause.  .  .  .  There  is  every  reason  to  be- 
lieve that  the  war  has  been  protracted  on 
this  account,"  etc. 

The  total  number  of  Regulars  engaged 
during  the  war  was  237,731;  the  total 
Militia  about  164,000 — roughly  a  total  of 
395,000  troops.  Our  maximum  was  in 
1776,  when  we  had  89,000,  and  it  dwindled 
to  a  little  over  29,000  in  1781.  In  1776  the 
British  had  20,171,  and  in  1781  they  had 


20  RAISING  AND 

42,000.  In  other  words,  Great  Britain, 
sluggishly  as  she  conducted  the  war,  was, 
nevertheless  growing  stronger,  and  had  it 
not  been  for  the  invaluable  assistance  of 
France,  it  is  not  improbable  that  the  war 
might  have  gone  against  us. 

Our  people  soon  forgot  the  lessons  of 
this  war,  remembering  only  that  we  came 
out  of  it  successfully.  The  war  was  ren- 
dered unnecessarily  long  and  expensive, 
both  in  men  and  money,  by  the  total  lack 
of  experience  of  our  statesmen  in  military 
matters.  Our  efficiency  was  undermined  by 
short  enlistments  and  the  failure  to  recog- 
nize the  danger  of  dependence  on  Volun- 
teers ;  also  by  ignorance  of  the  fact  that  the 
bounty  cannot  be  depended  upon  in  a  long 
war  and  failure  to  appreciate  the  fact  that 
troops  are  reliable  only  when  they  are  com- 
manded by  well  trained  officers  who  have 
at  least  received  reasonable  training  and 
discipline. 


MAINTAINING  ARMIES  21 

Shortly  after  the  close  of  the  war  the 
Army  was  practically  disbanded,  except 
Battery  F  (known  as  the  "Alexander 
Hamilton  Battery").  This  battery  has 
continued  in  our  service  since  the  Revolu- 
tion and  is  now  Battery  F  of  the  4th 
Artillery. 

Little  was  apparently  learned  from  the 
Revolution. 

There  were  reorganizations  of  the  Army 
in  1790,  1791  and  1792,  which  resulted  fi- 
nally in  an  army  of  5,500  men.  The  whole 
policy,  however,  was  rather  haphazard. 
There  was  no  system  worthy  of  the  name 
for  increasing  the  Army,  and  no  reserve 
of  trained  officers;  in  fact,  the  mistakes 
of  the  Revolution  had  apparently  been 
forgotten. 

In  1792  Baron  Steuben,  who  had  been 
of  great  value  to  the  Colonies  as  an  or- 
ganizer and  instructor  of  troops,  recom- 
mended that  the  Army  be  organized  as  a 


22  RAISING  AND 

legion,  and  the  Secretary  of  War  (General 
Knox)  was  so  impressed  with  the  idea  that 
he  proposed  to  apply  the  same  organiza- 
tion to  the  Militia,  dividing  it  into  three 
bodies,  designated  as  the  Advance,  Main 
and  Reserve  corps — first,  the  Advance 
Corps,  to  consist  of  men  from  18  to  20 
years  of  age,  inclusive — second,  the  Main 
Corps,  consisting  of  men  from  21  to  45 
years  of  age,  inclusive — third,  all  men 
from  45  to  60  years  of  age,  inclusive. 
All  members  of  the  Advance  Corps  under 
20  were  to  receive  military  instruction  for 
30  days  at  annual  camps. 

Other  young  men  of  the  Advance 
Corps  were  required  to  be  present  at  least 
ten  days  of  these  encampments.  The 
members  of  the  Main  Corps  were  to  re- 
ceive four  days'  instruction  per  year. 

Here  we  find  many  years  in  advance  of 
its  application  in  Europe  the  idea  of  a 
nation  in  arms ;  in  other  words,  an  endorse- 


MAINTAINING  ARMIES  23 

ment  of  the  policy  recommended  by  Jef- 
ferson :  namely,  that  we  must  classify  and 
train  all  our  male  citizens.  In  fact,  as  one 
studies  the  papers  of  the  early  Presidents, 
it  is  evident  everywhere  that  they  had  in 
mind  the  "nation  in  arms"  idea  when  they 
spoke  of  "our  main  reliance  being  the 
Militia,"  the  Militia  including,  as  it  did, 
all  men  between  the  ages  of  18  and  45.  It 
was  the  clear  intent  of  the  founders  of  the 
Republic  that  all  our  citizens  from  18  to 
45  should  be  trained  to  such  an  extent  as 
to  make  them  efficient  soldiers. 

The  legionary  organization  was  adopted 
for  the  Army  itself,  but  was  never  ex- 
tended to  the  Militia,  nor  were  the  classifi- 
cation and  training  put  in  operation. 

From  the  small  size  and  rather  tempor- 
ary character  of  the  regular  Military  es- 
tablishment, it  is  plain  that  the  intention 
was  to  depend  principally  upon  a  trained 
Militia,  and  had  this  idea  been  put  in  oper- 


24  RAISING  AND 

ation  through  an  effective  system  of 
training,  we  should  have  been  far  better 
prepared  for  our  subsequent  wars,  and 
eventually  have  adopted  a  sound  military 
policy,  characterized  by  an  appreciation 
of  the  necessity  of  training  men  and  pre- 
paring reserves  of  men  and  material  in 
advance. 

From  1792  reorganizations  and  shake- 
ups  in  the  Army  continued.  The  year 
1805  was  signalized  by  a  very  important 
event  in  our  military  history;  namely,  the 
establishment  at  West  Point,  which  was 
done  principally  on  the  recommendation 
of  Alexander  Hamilton. 

In  1812  the  Army  was  increased  in  view 
of  the  coming  war  with  England.  At  the 
commencement  of  this  war  the  Army  con- 
sisted of  6,744  men.  It  was  increased  in 
June  to  twenty-five  regiments  of  Infan- 
try, four  Artillery,  two  of  Dragoons 
and  one  of  Riflemen — a  total  of  36,700. 


MAINTAINING  ARMIES  25 

It  was  proposed  to  raise  30,000  Volun- 
teers. 

The  war  with  England  began  on  June 
18,  1812.  The  enemy  had  a  relatively 
small  force  of  regular  troops  in  Canada — 
about  4,500  effectives.  Our  standing  army 
was  a  little  less  than  7,000  men.  The  same 
old  haphazard  policy  which  had  charac- 
terized the  conduct  of  military  matters  in 
the  Revolution  was  continued.  Officers 
who  could  raise  men  were  given  commis- 
sions. The  Governors  of  some  of  the 
States  refused  to  furnish  Militia.  The  dif- 
ficulties of  a  confederacy  conducting  effec- 
tive military  operations  were  illustrated. 
Again  the  Militia  demonstrated  its  entire 
unreliability.  This  war,  from  the  stand- 
point of  military  inefficiency,  was  the  least 
creditable  of  our  wars ;  in  fact,  taken  as  a 
whole,  it  was  highly  discreditable  to  us  on 
land,  and  while  we  had  many  brilliant  in- 
dividual ship  actions  at  sea,  at  the  end 


26  RAISING  AND 

of  the  war  our  Navy  was  practically 
under  blockade,  and  our  commerce  almost 
destroyed. 

On  land,  with  the  exception  of  a  minor 
victory  on  the  Thames,  and  a  creditable 
action  at  Lundy's  Lane,  where  the  Regu- 
lars covered  themselves  with  glory,  and  the 
victory  at  New  Orleans  (fought  after  the 
war),  our  military  operations  cannot  be 
regarded  with  any  degree  of  satisfaction. 
In  a  word,  they  were  discreditable  to  us. 
Washington  was  captured  by  a  force  much 
less  in  numbers  than  that  of  the  defenders 
— with  a  loss  on  our  side  of  only  eight 
killed  and  eleven  wounded. 

We  put  into  this  war  527,000  men.  Of 
this  number  approximately  33,481  were 
officers.  The  largest  number  of  British 
regular  troops  which  were  on  the  continent 
at  any  one  time  during  this  war  was  ap- 
proximately 16,800.  In  cooperation  with 
them  were  some  thousands  of  Militia  and 


MAINTAINING  ARMIES  37 

Indians.  These,  however,  constituted  a 
very  small  force  in  comparison  with  the 
number  which  we  put  into  the  field. 

These  figures  bring  out  very  forcibly 
the  necessity  of  training  a  large  body  of 
officers  in  advance  of  war.  Especially  is 
this  important  if  we  are  to  depend  in  any 
way  upon  Volunteers. 

The  lessons  of  the  war  are  so  clear  that 
it  seems  hardly  necessary  to  state  that  it 
was  a  repetition  in  the  gravest  form  of 
many  of  the  blunders  of  the  Revolution, 
which  had  only  too  often  their  origin  in 
defective  military  legislation  and  lack  of 
preparation,  making  it  possible,  as  Upton 
puts  it,  that  "less  than  5,000  men  for  a 
period  of  two  years  brought  war  and  devas- 
tation into  our  territory  and  successfully 
withstood  the  misapplied  power  of  seven 
millions  of  people." 

Shortly  after  the  war  the  Army  was  re- 
duced to  10,000.  In  1817  came  the  Semi- 


28  RAISING  AND 

nole  War  and  the  same  haphazard  policy 
through  enlistments  of  many  different 
men.  New  arms,  new  equipments,  waste 
of  money  and  waste  of  life — the  same  pol- 
icy runs  through  the  Indian  wars  in  which 
we  were  engaged  in  subsequent  years. 

During  the  Seminole  and  Creek  Wars 
relatively  enormous  forces  of  troops  were 
employed  in  comparison  with  the  small 
force  of  Indians  who  opposed  us.  The 
cost  in  blood,  life  and  treasure  was  un- 
necessarily great.  The  whole  conduct  of 
the  war  spelt  poor  organization  and  lack 
of  intelligent  military  policy. 

In  1838  the  Army  was  increased  to 
about  12,500.  In  1842  it  was  again  re- 
duced to  8,600.  In  1846  the  rumble  of  the 
approaching  Mexican  war  was  heard,  and 
there  was  a  gradual  increase  in  the  Army. 
During  that  war  it  was  increased  to  about 
39,000  Regulars.  At  the  end  of  the  war  it 
was  again  reduced  to  10,300.  There  was 


MAINTAINING  ARMIES  29 

a  serious  effort  made  during  this  war  to 
increase  the  enlistment  period  and  to  fix  it 
at  a  minimum  of  twelve  months,  or  for  the 
war.  The  total  number  of  men  employed 
during  this  war  was  104,000.  It  was  a 
brilliantly  successful  war,  and  to  quote 
again  from  Upton,  who  is  almost  the  sole 
authority  from  which  we  draw  accurate 
data  concerning  our  wars : 

"Successes  so  brilliant  would  appar- 
ently denote  the  perfection  of  military 
policy,  but,  paradoxical  as  it  may  seem, 
official  documents  establish  the  fact  that 
they  were  achieved  under  the  very  same 
system  of  laws  and  executive  orders  which 
in  the  preceding  foreign  war  had  led  to  a 
series  of  disasters  culminating  in  the  cap- 
ture and  destruction  of  our  capital. 

"The  explanation  of  this  paradox  is  to 
be  found  partly  in  the  difference  of  char- 
acter of  our  adversaries,  but  more  espe- 
cially in  the  quality  of  the  Regular  Army, 


30  RAISING  AND 

with  which  we  began  the  two  wars.  For 
the  Mexican  War,  as  for  the  War  of  1812, 
the  Government  had  ample  time  to 
prepare." 

This  quotation  covers  the  situation  very 
well.  Our  enemy  was  not  a  well  prepared 
enemy,  and  the  scene  of  action  was  so  dis- 
tant from  the  source  from  which  troops 
were  drawn  that  the  troops  were  in  hand 
for  a  long  enough  period  to  get  them  into 
fairly  effective  shape.  There  was  an  ex- 
ceptionally efficient  body  of  regular 
officers. 

Again  there  was  a  relatively  small  force 
of  militia  employed — only  12,500  out  of  a 
force  of  104,000  as  compared  with  458,000 
out  of  a  force  of  521,000  in  the  War  of 
1812. 

We  now  come  to  the  great  Civil  War. 
Our  population  was  nearly  31,000,000. 
We  had  a  small  regular  army  scattered 
over  a  vast  area.  It  numbered  a  little 


MAINTAINING  ARMIES  31 

over  16,000  men.  Some  of  it  was  west  of 
the  Mississippi;  in  fact,  it  was  scattered 
from  the  Canadian  border  to  the  Mexican 
frontier,  and  drawn  out  in  a  thin  line  along 
our  western  frontier.  We  were  unpre- 
pared as  usual.  Fortunately  the  seceding 
States  were  equally  unprepared,  and  it  was 
a  case  of  two  nations  entering  into  war, 
both  unprepared,  and  each  having  to  de- 
velop its  military  resources  in  the  way  of 
men  and  material  as  the  war  went  on. 
There  is  no  doubt  whatever  in  the  mind  of 
any  intelligent  student  of  military  matters 
that  had  either  side  possessed  a  well 
organized  and  well  disciplined  force  of 
50,000  men,  that  that  side  would  have 
occupied  the  other's  capital  almost  imme- 
diately. 

Dependence  was  placed  upon  both  Mili- 
tia and  Volunteers.  The  Militia  was  un- 
satisfactory, as  has  generally  been  the  case. 
The  conduct  of  Governors  was  too  often 


32  RAISING  AND 

characterized  by  party  affiliations.  The 
political  aspects  of  the  war  are  too  well 
known  to  require  discussion. 

The  main  dependence  of  the  country 
was  placed  upon  the  Volunteers.  This 
was  true  of  both  North  and  South,  and  in 
each  instance  it  was  necessary  to  go  to  the 
draft.  The  cost  in  blood  and  treasure  was 
tremendous.  Out  of  this  military  chaos 
eventually  came  two  splendid  armies — ar- 
mies, however,  created  at  tremendous  cost. 

The  old  policy  was  adopted — first  Mi- 
litia and  Volunteers,  followed  by  the  draft, 
bounties  with  their  attendant  evils,  wide- 
spread desertion,  bounty  jumping,  etc. 
Fortunately  it  was  a  struggle  amongst 
ourselves.  Had  the  country  as  a  whole 
been  attacked  by  a  well  organized  nation 
of  equal  population,  but  with  fully  devel- 
oped military  resources,  we  could  have 
looked  for  but  one  result.  The  lessons  of 
all  the  above  referred  to  wars  point  out 


MAINTAINING  ARMIES  33 

very  clearly  to  what  our  weakness  has  been 
due,  namely,  first — the  lack  of  any  ade- 
quate military  preparation,  second — de- 
pendence upon  an  unsound  military  policy, 
as  indicated  by  the  maintenance  of  an  in- 
adequate Regular  Army  and  dependence 
upon  Militia  and  Volunteers;  also  failure 
to  avail  ourselves  of  the  full  military 
strength  of  the  nation. 

Again  quoting  Upton:  "Any  Govern- 
ment which  foregoes  its  rights  to  compul- 
sory military  service  becomes  more  and 
more  enslaved  by  depending  solely  upon 
voluntary  military  service,  induced  by  gifts 
of  money,  land  and  clothing." 

The  voluntary  system  failed  us  in  the 
past,  and  will  fail  us  in  the  future.  It  is 
uncertain  in  operation,  prevents  organ- 
ized preparation,  tends  to  destroy  that 
individual  sense  of  obligation  for  military 
service  which  should  be  found  in  every  citi- 
zen, costs  excessively  in  life  and  treasure, 


34  RAISING  AND 

and  does  not  permit  that  condition  of  pre- 
paredness which  must  exist  if  we  are  to 
wage  war  successfully  with  any  great 
power  prepared  for  war.  The  question 
is :  What  shall  we  do  to  adequately  pre- 
pare ourselves  for  war,  without  establish- 
ing a  huge  standing  army  or  bringing 
about  a  condition  which  might  be  described 
as  one  of  militarism,  which  term,  as  I  use 
it,  means  the  condition  under  which  the 
military  forces  of  a  nation  demand  and 
secure  special  recognition,  both  socially 
and  officially,  and  exercise  an  undue  influ- 
ence in  the  conduct  of  the  civil  affairs  of 
the  government,  both  at  home  and  abroad. 
In  other  words,  a  condition  which  may  be 
described  as  one  under  which  the  military 
element  dominates  the  nation's  policy. 
Nothing  could  be  more  unfortunate  than 
the  establishment  of  such  a  condition  in 
this  country  or  elsewhere,  so  far  as  devel- 
opment on  normal  lines  is  concerned. 


MAINTAINING  ARMIES  35 

However,  a  condition  of  thorough  pre- 
paredness can  be  established  without  creat- 
ing a  condition  of  militarism.  Switzerland 
is  an  illustration  of  this  possibility.  Here 
we  have  a  country  noted  for  its  patriotism, 
distinguished  for  conservatism  and  good 
government,  with  a  people  noted  for  intel- 
ligence, industry  and  good  conduct,  yet 
every  man  who  is  physically  fit  has, 
with  few  exceptions,  received  a  sufficient 
amount  of  military  training  to  fit  him  to 
be  an  efficient  soldier. 

It  has  been  accomplished  in  great  part 
during  his  school  period,  and  at  camps  of 
instruction  during  his  youth,  and  so  thor- 
ough and  complete  is  the  system  that  at 
the  end  of  his  school  and  other  training 
received  during  this  period  it  is  only  neces- 
sary to  give  him  from  two  to  three  months 
intensive  training  in  camp,  according  to 
the  arm  in  which  he  is  to  serve,  to  fit  him 
for  the  final  discharge  of  his  duties.  The 


36  RAISING  AND 

training  for  officers  is,  of  course,  extended 
over  longer  periods,  but  all  of  this  training 
is  accomplished  without  any  interference 
worthy  of  consideration  with  the  youth's 
educational  and  industrial  career.  In  fact, 
he  is  better  physically,  morally  and  better 
as  a  citizen,  because  of  his  training.  He 
has  learned  to  respect  the  flag  of  his  coun- 
try and  to  have  a  proper  regard  for  the 
rights  of  others,  and  he  has  had  built  up  in 
him  an  appreciation  of  his  obligation  to 
serve  the  country  in  time  of  war.  He  rea- 
lizes that  this  is  a  tax  on  which  all  others 
depend,  and  on  the  payment  of  which  in 
good  faith  the  life  of  the  nation  itself  rests. 
Australia  has  inaugurated  a  somewhat 
similar  system,  having  in  view  the  same 
general  purpose;  namely,  the  preparation 
of  every  male  who  is  physically  fit  for  mili- 
tary duty.  Our  situation,  of  course,  differs 
from  that  of  Switzerland,  because  we  must 
maintain  at  all  times  a  standing  army  ade- 


MAINTAINING  ARMIES  37 

quate  for  the  peace  needs  of  the  nation.  By 
this  I  mean  the  garrison  of  the  Panama 
Canal,  Alaska  and  the  oversea  possessions ; 
also  a  force  within  continental  United 
States  adequate  to  meet  the  needs  of  the 
country  in  the  way  of  furnishing  garrisons 
for  the  sea  coast  defenses  and  a  sufficient 
mobile  force  to  control  internal  disorders 
or  to  provide  an  expeditionary  force  for 
minor  operations,  such  as  those  incident 
to  the  recent  occupation  of  Cuba  or  Vera 
Cruz. 

The  Swiss  system  costs  about  $6,500,000 
a  year.  There  can  be  no  question  of  its 
benefit  to  the  people  from  an  economic 
standpoint,  as  well  as  from  a  military 
standpoint.  The  influence  in  bettering 
citizenship  is  shown  in  the  criminal  rate  of 
Switzerland,  which  is  only  a  small  fraction 
of  our  own.  We  must  adopt  a  system 
based  on  these  general  lines  if  we  are  ever 
to  be  efficiently  prepared  for  war  or, 


38  RAISING  AND 

better  said,  prepared  against  war,  for  our 
preparation  is  really  an  insurance  against 
war  rather  than  an  incentive  to  it.  Do  not 
place  any  dependence  upon  the  statements 
of  these  charlatans  who  speak  of  a  million 
men  flocking  to  arms  between  sun  and  sun, 
but  remember  when  you  hear  fallacies  of 
this  sort  the  words  of  old  Light-Horse 
Harry  Lee,  which  are  as  true  today  as 
they  were  when  they  were  uttered.  We 
must  preserve  our  ideals,  strive  for  world 
peace,  and  do  what  we  can  to  build  up  the 
adjustment  of  international  difficulties 
through  arbitration,  but  we  must  not  fail 
to  give  due  heed  to  the  conditions  under 
which  we  live.  Whatever  we  may  hope  for 
in  the  way  of  universal  peace  does  not  jus- 
tify us  in  disregarding  the  conditions 
which  surround  us  today.  If  we  want  to 
hand  down  to  our  children  the  heritage 
which  has  come  to  us  from  our  fathers,  we 
must  not  place  confidence  in  idle  boasting 


MAINTAINING  ARMIES  39 

but  give  serious  heed  to  well  thought  out 
preparation  and  adopt  a  policy  for  the  fu- 
ture with  reference  to  our  military  estab- 
lishment very  different  from  that  which 
has  existed  in  the  past.  We  can  do  this 
without  violating  our  ideals.  If  I  were  to 
state  such  a  military  policy  I  would  say, 
briefly,  have  an  Army  sufficient  for  the 
peace  needs  of  the  nation,  a  good  Militia, 
an  adequate  Navy,  and  behind  them  the 
largest  possible  number  of  men  trained  to 
be  efficient  soldiers  if  needed,  but  in  time 
of  peace  following  their  ordinary  civil  oc- 
cupations— ready  to  come  when  wanted. 
A  country  so  prepared  will  have  the  lar- 
gest possible  measure  of  peace. 


II 


THE  MILITARY  OBLIGATION 
OF  CITIZENSHIP 

I  always  have  impressed  upon  me  at 
meetings  of  this  kind  the  evident  failure 
on  the  part  of  members  of  the  conference 
to  appreciate  the  position  of  officers  of  the 
Army  and  Navy  with  reference  to  the  mil- 
itary situation.  The  officers  of  the  Army 
and  Navy  are  the  professional  servants  of 
the  Government  in  matters  pertaining  to 
the  military  establishment,  and  its  agents 
in  the  conduct  of  military  operations  when 
such  become  necessary.  They  do  not  ini- 
tiate wars.  You  are  mostly  business  men 
engaged  in  trade  and  commerce.  Nine- 
tenths  of  all  wars  have  their  origin  directly 

40 


OF  CITIZENSHIP  41 

or  indirectly  in  issues  arising  out  of  trade. 
You  the  people  make  war ;  the  Government 
declares  it;  and  we,  the  officers  of  the 
Army  and  Navy,  are  charged  with  the  re- 
sponsibility of  terminating  it  with  such 
means  and  implements  as  you  may  give  us. 

Being  more  or  less  familiar  with  the  re- 
quirements of  the  military  situation,  we 
naturally  try  to  impress  upon  you  the 
necessity  of  a  reasonable  degree  of  pre- 
paredness, both  in  the  way  of  personnel, 
proper  organization  and  material  re- 
sources. We  realize  far  more  fully  than 
vou  how  necessary  organized  preparation 
is,  especially  in  these  days  when  our  possi- 
ble opponents  are  so  thoroughly  equipped 
and  entirely  ready  for  military  activity. 

There  is  a  tendency  at  all  these  confer- 
ences to  invoke  the  advice  of  Washington, 
Jefferson,  Adams  and  other  of  our  presi- 
dents and  statesmen,  given  in  the  past  to 
our  countrymen  on  many  matters,  but  I 


42  MILITARY  OBLIGATION 

have  heard  no  reference  this  year  or  last  as 
to  their  advice  on  the  question  of  military 
preparedness.  You  all,  of  course,  know 
how  earnestly  Washington,  Jefferson, 
Adams  and  many  others  urged  upon  our 
people  the  vital  importance  of  prepared- 
ness as  the  best  means  of  preventing  war. 
Washington  frequently  urges  this  upon 
the  attention  of  our  people,  as  does  Jef- 
ferson in  messages  and  in  his  letters  to 
Monroe.  Adams  states  it  tersely  to  the 
effect  that  it  is  the  only  means  by  which 
we  can  preserve  peace.  The  soundness 
and  correctness  of  this  advice  is  apparent 
to  all  soldiers  and  it  has  been  again  and 
again  brought  to  the  attention  of  our  peo- 
ple. Light-Horse  Harry  Lee,  of  the  Rev- 
olution, said: 

"Convinced  as  I  am  that  a  government 
is  the  murderer  of  its  citizens  which  sends 
them  to  the  field  uninformed  and  un- 
taught, where  they  are  to  meet  men  of  the 


OF  CITIZENSHIP  43 

same  age  and  strength,  mechanized  by  ed- 
ucation and  discipline  for  battle,  I  cannot 
withhold  my  denunciation  of  its  wicked- 
ness and  folly." 

Those  words  were  absolutely  true  at  the 
time  they  were  uttered  and  they  are 
equally  true  today,  and  I  want  to  impress 
upon  you  who  know  so  little  of  war,  that 
those  of  us  whose  business  it  is  to  know 
something  of  it  and  the  requirements  in  the 
way  of  preparation,  are  most  deeply  con- 
cerned, not  only  from  the  standpoint  of 
military  efficiency,  but  also  on  the  broad 
general  grounds  of  common  humanity,  in 
establishing  a  system  under  which  our 
young  men  may  receive  that  degree  of 
training  which  will  better  fit  them  to 
discharge  with  a  reasonable  degree  of 
efficiency  their  duties  as  soldiers  in  the 
defence  of  the  country  in  case  they  are 
needed  and  thereby  tend  to  reduce  to  the 
lowest  possible  terms  the  cost  in  blood  and 


44  MILITARY  OBLIGATION 

treasure  and  to  make  such  expenditure  as 
is  inevitable,  efficient  and  of  value,  instead 
of  wasting  precious  lives  without  avail. 
Our  President  in  his  last  message  states: 

"It  will  be  right  enough,  right  Ameri- 
can policy,  based  upon  our  accustomed 
principles  and  practices,  to  provide  a  sys- 
tem by  which  every  citizen  who  will  volun- 
teer for  the  training  may  be  made  familiar 
with  the  use  of  modern  arms,  the  rudi- 
ments of  drill  and  maneuver,  and  the 
maintenance  and  sanitation  of  camps." 

There  are  several  things  which  have  ren- 
dered preparedness  necessary  to  a  greater 
extent  than  ever  before;  the  first  is  the 
great  improvement  in  transportation.  In 
the  days  when  Washington,  Jefferson  and 
Adams  were  urging  upon  us  the  necessity 
of  preparedness,  our  possible  enemies  were 
without  anything  like  the  military  estab- 
lishment of  the  great  powers  of  today. 
Transportation  over  the  sea  was  by  sailing 


OF  CITIZENSHIP  45 

ship,  and  was  slow  and  very  difficult,  and 
consequently  considerable  time  was  given 
for  preparation.  Indeed,  there  is  no  de- 
partment connected  with  military  prepar- 
edness in  which  there  has  been  a  greater 
advance  than  in  means  of  transportation. 
There  has  also  been  a  great  advance  made 
in  the  power  and  efficiency  of  weapons. 
They  have  become  more  complex,  many 
of  them  are  very  intricate  machines  which 
require  a  great  degree  of  skill  in  their 
handling,  with  resulting  long  period  of 
instruction  on  the  part  of  the  personnel. 
The  advance  in  weapons  is  quite  as  notable 
as  that  in  transportation,  and  the  weapon 
of  today  is  as  far  ahead  of  the  weapon  in 
the  times  of  Washington  as  is  the  vesti- 
bule train  ahead  of  the  cart  of  those  days. 
In  other  words  on  one  side  we  have  a 
greatly  increased  condition  of  prepared- 
ness and  greatly  shortened  period  of  ap- 
proach through  betterment  in  the  means 


46  MILITARY  OBLIGATION 

of  transportation,  and  on  the  other  hand 
we  have  consequently  a  shortened  period 
to  get  ready  combined  with  the  necessity 
of  familiarizing  ourselves  not  with  the  sim- 
ple weapons  of  our  fathers  but  with  the 
complex  and  intricate  weapons  of  today 
requiring  a  high  degree  of  skill  in  their 
use;  the  unprepared,  unready  defense 
labors  under  greater  embarrassments  than 
ever  and  the  prepared  aggressor  has  more 
in  his  favor  than  ever  before. 

The  officers  of  the  Army  and  Navy  are 
as  I  have  said  not  the  persons  who  make 
wars,  their  task  is  to  conduct  them  as  effi- 
ciently as  possible,  and  by  efficiently  I 
mean  not  only  efficiency  in  the  ordinary 
sense  of  the  term  but  efficiency  in  all  which 
pertains  to  the  saving  of  life.  We  do  not 
want  to  see  the  youth  of  this  country  sent 
to  arms  untrained  and  unready  to  meet 
equally  good  men  who  are  trained  and 
ready  and  while  we  may  all  earnestly  hope 


OF  CITIZENSHIP  47 

that  war  will  be  no  more,  we  are  convinced 
that  for  the  present  at  least  such  is  not  the 
case.  We  must  judge  the  future  largely 
by  the  past  and  however  earnestly  we  may 
hope  to  avoid  war  there  is  nothing  in  the 
history  of  the  past  or  the  events  of  the  pres- 
ent or  the  promises  of  the  future  which 
justifies  the  assumption  that  we  shall  not 
be  again  confronted  by  war,  and  those  of 
us  who  know  what  war  means  want  you 
to  approve  those  moderate,  reasonable  and 
necessary  measures  which  will  tend  in  the 
first  place  to  prevent  war,  and  in  case  it 
is  unavoidable  will  tend  to  make  it  as  short 
and  as  little  costly  in  blood  and  treasure 
as  possible. 

If  you  were  living  under  conditions 
which  rendered  it  necessary  for  your  boys 
and  men  to  furnish  the  crews  for  the  life 
boat  service  you  would  see  to  it  that  they 
knew  how  to  row  and  swim  so  that  they 
would  be  prepared  for  the  dangers  of  the 


48  MILITARY  OBLIGATION 

work  which  you  knew  would  some  day 
come  to  them  and  if  any  one  pressed  un- 
trained boys  into  such  service  you  would 
say  that  it  was  little  short  of  murder.  This 
is  what  Light-Horse  Harry  Lee  said  with 
reference  to  the  untrained  troops  of  the 
Revolution,  and  it  is  what  those  of  us  who 
know  something  of  war  and  of  the  neces- 
sary preparation  therefor  say  will  be  the 
case  if  the  youth  of  this  country  are  again 
sent  into  war  unprepared  to  efficiently  dis- 
charge their  duties.  We  are  working  not 
for  war,  but  for  preparation  in  the  first 
place  against  it  and  in  the  second  place 
for  preparation  which  if  it  comes  will  ren- 
der it  as  short  and  bloodless  as  possible. 
While  cherishing  our  ideals  and  hopes  for 
the  future  and  continuing  our  efforts  to 
bring  about  desired  results  in  the  way  of 
world  peace,  we  must  not  be  misled  or  un- 
mindful of  the  actual  conditions  which  sur- 
round us  today  and  will  surround  us  for 


OF  CITIZENSHIP  49 

an  indefinite  period  of  time;  in  other 
words,  we  can  not  without  jeopardizing 
the  best  interests  of  our  country  fail  to 
make  proper  preparations  against  possible 
war;  such  preparations  will  exert  the  lar- 
gest measure  of  influence  for  peace,  and  in 
case  war  is  forced  upon  us,  will  enable  us 
to  conduct  it  with  the  least  possible  ex- 
penditure of  blood  and  treasure. 


Ill 

THE  CIVIL  OBLIGATION  OF 
THE  ARMY 

It  is  always  an  inspiration  to  meet  a 
body  of  enthusiastic  youngsters  who  have 
the  world  ahead  of  them,  and  if  one  can  do 
anything  to  make  more  clear  the  respon- 
sibilities and  obligations  which  confront 
them  and  suggest  a  way  to  meet  and  over- 
come them,  it  is  a  duty  which  should  be 
performed.  What  I  wish  to  say  to  you  may 
sound  a  bit  harsh  and  inject  an  element 
of  seriousness  into  this  occasion  which  will 
tend  a  little  to  take  from  it  the  spirit  of 
joyousness.  I  am  going  to  say  something 
to  you  about  your  obligations  to  the  coun- 
try as  soldiers,  for  you  come  of  the  stock 

50 


OF  THE  ARMY  51 

and  represent  a  class  whose  responsibility 
to  the  country  in  time  of  war  has  always 
been  generous. 

I  noticed  today  your  fine  soldiers'  mon- 
ument, erected  in  honor  of  the  graduates 
of  the  school  who  gave  their  lives  in  the 
nation's  service  in  the  Spanish  War. 
Among  them  are  the  names  of  men  of  my 
regiment.  The  response  of  these  men  is 
indicative  of  the  response  which  is  going 
to  be  made  by  men  of  their  kind  in  the  fu- 
ture. You  are  going  to  respond  whether 
you  are  trained  or  not.  What  I  want  to 
bring  home  to  you  is  that  to  be  a  really  good 
citizen  of  a  republic  which  is  dependent 
upon  its  citizen  army  you  must  be  not  only 
willing  but  prepared,  and  I  want  to  say 
to  the  parents  and  friends  assembled  here 
tonight  that  they  must  remember  that 
these  youngsters  are  going  to  respond  to 
the  call  of  the  country  whether  they  wish 
it  or  not;  that  it  is  a  duty  which  the  great 


52  CIVIL  OBLIGATION 

majority  of  right  minded  boys  will  not  at- 
tempt to  shirk,  and  the  question  I  want  to 
ask  them  is — Are  they  going  to  send  these 
boys  to  us  prepared  to  be  efficient  soldiers 
or  are  they  going  to  send  them  to  us  un- 
trained and  unprepared  to  make  such  sac- 
rifice as  they  may  have  to  make  effective? 

This  subject  was  brought  home  to  me 
very  forcibly  the  other  day  by  a  letter  re- 
ceived from  a  friend  in  the  West,  who  had 
just  lost  his  boy  in  the  battle  at  Ypres. 
He  said: 

"You  remember  the  last  time  we  met 
that  I  told  you  of  my  17-year-old  boy  at 
school  in  England.  Well,  he  left  school 
and  went  into  the  Home  Defense  force, 
but  this  was  not  enough,  and  he  trans- 
ferred and  joined  a  regiment  at  the  front 
— one  of  the  new  regiments — and  was 
killed  at  Ypres.  It  was  sad  enough  and 
hard  enough  to  lose  the  boy,  but  I  shall 
never  be  able  to  get  rid  of  the  feeling  that 


OF  THE  ARMY  53 

neither  he  nor  his  mates  had  a  sporting 
chance;  they  were  unprepared  and  un- 
trained." 

Before  going  into  the  details  of  this  sub- 
ject I  want  to  impress  one  fact  upon  you, 
and  that  is  that  our  country  has  never  yet 
in  its  entire  history  met  single  handed  a 
first-class  country  prepared  for  war.  The 
shrinkage  in  enlistments  and  steady  dimi- 
nution in  the  strength  of  our  military 
establishment  during  our  struggle  for 
independence  points  out  clearly  and  con- 
clusively to  any  fair-minded  person  the 
invaluable  assistance  of  France  in  the 
Revolution.  In  the  War  of  1812-1814  we 
were,  from  a  military  standpoint,  a  minor 
issue,  for  Great  Britain  was  engaged  in 
that  tremendous  struggle  with  Napoleon 
— a  struggle  which  required  the  great  bulk 
of  her  forces  on  sea  and  land  and  pro- 
hibited her  from  concentrating  her  efforts 
upon  the  war  in  America. 


54  CIVIL  OBLIGATION 

The  question  is — Shall  we  drift  on,  re- 
gardless of  the  teachings  of  history,  mak- 
ing no  adequate  preparation  for  the 
possibilities  of  the  hour,  or  shall  we  take 
heed  from  the  experiences  of  the  past,  not 
only  of  our  own  country,  but  of  all  lands 
since  history  was  written,  which  is,  that 
preparedness  is  the  best  insurance  against 
war,  or  shall  we  accept  as  our  guide  for 
the  future  the  theory  of  those  deluded  peo- 
ple who  tell  us  that  wars  are  over  and  that 
this  is  the  last  great  war,  forgetful  of  the 
fact  that  these  same  people,  or  people  of 
the  same  type  of  intelligence,  announced 
that  the  Russo-Japanese  War  was  the  last 
war,  then  that  the  Balkan  War  was  the 
last  war?  The  answer  is  no.  We  must 
judge  the  future  by  the  past  and  make 
wise  preparation  to  protect  and  safeguard 
those  rights  which  our  forefathers  handed 
down  to  us.  It  seems  to  me  that  no  right- 
minded  person  can  hesitate  in  deciding 


OF  THE  ARMY  55 

which  is  the  path  of  wisdom  and  which  is 
the  path  of  folly. 

We  do  not  want  war,  but  we  must  not 
forget  that  there  is  many  a  peace  which  is 
infinitely  worse  than  war,  such  as  a  peace 
which  results  from  failure  to  do  our  clear 
duty  to  fight  for  what  we  believe  is  right 
or  to  support  our  honest  convictions.  We 
in  this  country  do  not  want  a  large  stand- 
ing army,  nor  do  we  desire  anything  which 
savors  of  militarism.  We  do  need  and 
those  who  are  intelligent  enough  to  appre- 
ciate the  situation  want,  an  adequate  army. 
By  this  I  mean  an  army  sufficient  for  the 
peace  needs  of  the  nation,  which  means  the 
garrisoning  of  the  Philippines,  Panama, 
Hawaii,  Alaska  and  Porto  Rico,  together 
with  such  force  in  the  United  States  as  will 
be  sufficient  for  an  expeditionary  force, 
such  as  we  sent  to  Cuba,  or  to  deal  with 
internal  disorders  which  neither  the  police 
nor  militia  may  be  adequate  to  control. 


56  CIVIL  OBLIGATION 

We  must  have  an  adequate  navy,  sufficient 
to  perform  a  navy's  function — on  one 
ocean  in  any  case,  and,  if  we  are  wise,  on 
both  oceans.  Both  the  army  and  navy 
must  be  supported  by  adequate  reserves — 
the  navy  with  a  reserve  strong  enough  to 
completely  man  the  second  line  ships  or- 
dinarily out  of  commission  and  the  many 
supply  ships  and  auxiliary  ships  which 
must  be  put  into  commission  in  time  of 
war,  and  in  addition  men  enough  to  make 
good  the  losses  of  the  first  six  months  of 
war.  We  must  also  have  a  good  Militia 
with  reserves,  under  a  large  measure  of 
federal  control — a  Militia  whose  response 
to  the  calls  of  the  nation  will  be  prompt 
and  certain — one  which  will  come  well 
trained  and  well  equipped.  This  can  only 
be  accomplished  through  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment fixing  the  standards  and  exercis- 
ing the  necessary  power  of  inspection. 
Unless  this  can  be  done  the  Militia  cannot 


OF  THE  ARMY  57 

be  considered  a  dependable  force.  Back 
of  it  is  that  great  force  of  citizen  soldiers, 
ordinarily  known  as  volunteers — a  force 
which  must  be  trained  in  time  of  peace,  in 
order  to  be  promptly  available  in  time  of 
war.  In  any  case  the  officers  of  this  force 
must  be  provided  in  time  of  peace  and 
their  provision  must  include  thorough,  sys- 
tematic training. 

We  cannot  depend  upon  volunteers  in 
future  wars,  as  we  have  in  past  wars,  for 
the  simple  reason  that  the  onrush  of  a 
modern  war  is  so  sudden  and  all  our  possi- 
ble antagonists,  concerning  whom  we  need 
have  any  serious  apprehension,  are  so 
thoroughly  prepared  that  there  will  be  no 
time  to  train  volunteers,  and  certainly  no 
time  to  train  officers.  Washington  and 
the  officers  of  his  time  were  convinced  of 
the  folly  of  depending  upon  volunteers. 
They  come  with  a  rush  from  the  best  of 
the  population  during  the  early  stages  of 


58  CIVIL  OBLIGATION 

war,  but  their  enthusiasm  soon  passes 
away  and  the  bounty  and  the  draft  follow. 
In  the  Revolution  our  greatest  force  was, 
in  1776,  about  89,000  men.  It  dwindled 
year  by  year  so  that  in  1781  we  had  in  the 
field  only  a  little  over  29,000  men,  and  this 
notwithstanding  large  bounties  of  money 
and  land  and  the  strongest  efforts  on  the 
part  of  individuals  and  Colonial  assem- 
blies. The  same  thing  took  place  in  the 
War  of  1812-1814.  Men  came  for  a  short 
time,  but  new  men  had  to  take  their  places ; 
527,000  different  men  were  in  the  field 
during  this  war.  Of  this  number  some- 
thing over  33,000  were  officers. 

The  frequent  change  of  personnel  re- 
sulted in  demoralization  and  inefficiency. 
It  was  again  attempted  through  the 
bounty  to  produce  effects  which  should 
have  been  produced  by  patriotism.  In  the 
Revolution,  which  was  really  the  birth 
struggle  of  the  nation,  the  falling  off  in 


OF  THE  ARMY  59 

volunteering  is  worthy  of  the  most  serious 
consideration,  as  is  the  chaotic  condition 
which  resulted  from  the  working  of  the 
same  system  in  the  War  of  1812-1814. 
This  war  on  land  was  highly  discreditable 
to  us.  With  the  exception  of  a  drawn 
battle  at  Lundy's  Lane  and  an  unimpor- 
tant victory  on  the  Thames,  our  land 
operations  were  not  only  disastrous,  but 
generally  highly  discreditable.  We  aban- 
doned Washington  to  a  force  of  only 
about  six  per  cent  of  that  of  the  defenders, 
with  a  loss  on  our  side  of  eight  killed  and 
eleven  wounded.  The  greatest  force  of 
regulars  which  England  had  in  this  coun- 
try at  any  time  during  the  war  was  a  little 
over  16,800.  There  was,  of  course,  a  con- 
siderable number  of  Indians  and  Militia, 
but  this  combined  force  was  only  a  small 
fraction  of  our  numerically  great  force. 
At  the  battle  of  New  Orleans  (fought 
after  the  war)  we  won  a  highly  creditable 


60  CIVIL  OBLIGATION 

victory.  Our  troops  were  well  handled 
and  the  enemy  attempted  the  impossible. 
Moreover,  the  bulk  of  the  men  who  com- 
posed Jackson's  army  were  expert  with 
the  rifle. 

On  the  water  we  had  many  highly  cred- 
itable individual  ship  actions  and  some 
creditable  fleet  actions,  but  generally 
speaking,  on  the  high  seas  our  commerce 
was  destroyed  and  our  gallant  but  small 
navy  bottled  up. 

In  the  Civil  War  we  of  necessity  con- 
tinued the  volunteer  system,  no  general 
policy  looking  to  military  efficiency  having 
been  inaugurated,  and  the  two  armies, 
each  undisciplined  and  untrained,  learned 
the  game  of  war  together,  and  after  sev- 
eral years  were  moulded  into  excellent 
fighting  machines.  In  this  war,  as  in  pre- 
ceding wars,  the  volunteer  system  failed 
absolutely,  and  both  the  North  and  the 
South  had  to  go  to  the  draft  and  every 


OF  THE  ARMY  61 

attendant  evil  of  the  bounty  system, 
with  its  accompanying  desertions,  bounty 
jumping,  etc.,  which  tended  to  demoralize 
the  public  conscience  in  all  which  pertained 
to  the  sacredness  of  the  military  obligation. 
The  number  of  desertions  was  enormous. 
Charles  Francis  Adams  places  it  as  high 
as  523,000  out  of  a  total  enlistment  in  the 
northern  armies  of  something  over  2,700,- 
000,  or  nearly  one  in  five. 

In  the  Mexican  War  we  met  an  unpre- 
pared and  rather  ineffective  enemy  and  the 
theater  of  war  was  so  remote  that  our  men 
were  in  hand  long  enough  to  get  them  into 
reasonably  good  shape,  at  least  to  meet  an 
enemy  of  the  type  which  confronted  us. 
We  had,  moreover,  an  unusually  able  body 
of  officers,  many  of  whom  distinguished 
themselves  greatly  in  the  Civil  War;  but 
again,  as  in  all  our  wars,  had  we  met  a  pre- 
pared and  efficient  enemy  the  system 
would  have  been  our  undoing. 


62  CIVIL  OBLIGATION 

You  must  never  for  a  moment  accept 
the  very  common  idea,  brought  into  being 
largely  by  the  politicians  and  the  Fourth 
of  July  orator,  that  we  as  a  nation  have 
peculiar  military  ability  and  that  without 
thorough  training  we  can  meet  equally 
good  men  who  have  been  well  trained. 

The  cowardly  abandonment  of  our  cap- 
ital almost  without  loss  on  our  part  shows 
how  unsafe  it  is  to  trust  untrained  troops 
in  combat  with  well-organized,  well-disci- 
plined troops.  You  must  remember  also 
that  this  particular  action  occurred  almost 
within  a  generation  of  the  Revolutionary 
War,  and  that  the  men  who  made  up  the 
force  defending  Washington  were  drawn 
from  sections  which  produced  many  of  the 
best  troops  of  the  Revolution.  Old  Light- 
Horse  Harry  Lee  summed  the  situation  as 
follows : 

"That  government  is  a  murderer  of  its 
citizens  which  sends  them  to  the  field  un- 


OF  THE  ARMY  63 

informed  and  untaught,  where  they  are  to 
meet  men  of  the  same  age  and  strength, 
mechanized  by  education  and  discipline  for 
battle." 

Those  words  are  just  as  true  and  just 
as  applicable  today  as  they  were  when  they 
were  uttered.  We  are  no  longer  an  Anglo- 
Saxon  race,  but  a  very  mixed  one.  Blood 
strains  from  all  parts  of  Europe  run 
through  out  people,  and  their  influence  is 
felt  in  the  descendants  of  the  new-comers. 
Everything  indicates  the  necessity  today, 
more  than  ever  before,  of  thorough  prepar- 
ation. Now,  while  we  do  not  desire  a  large 
standing  army,  we  must  have  the  kind  of 
army  and  an  army  of  the  strength  referred 
to  above.  We  must  have  also  a  great  body 
of  35,000  or  40,000  reserve  officers  trained 
and  ready  to  serve  as  officers  of  volunteers. 
We  must  have  a  sound  military  system — 
one  which  tends  to  produce  in  the  heart  of 
every  boy  the  consciousness  of  the  fact  that 


64  CIVIL  OBLIGATION 

he  is  one  of  the  defenders  of  the  country 
and  impels  him  to  make  the  necessary 
preparation. 

The  military  systems  of  Switzerland  or 
Australia  appeal  to  me  very  strongly  as 
models  which  we  could  follow  to  our  ad- 
vantage in  all  which  pertains  to  military 
training.  Switzerland  has  had  her  system 
in  operation  long  enough  to  make  its  appli- 
cation general,  and  as  a  result,  while  a 
peaceful,  orderly  country,  she  stands  al- 
ways ready  to  defend  her  rights  and  to 
guard  her  territory.  She  is  absolutely  free 
from  all  indication  of  militarism,  as  ordi- 
narily understood,  and  yet  every  man  in 
Switzerland  who  is  physically  fit  has  re- 
ceived a  sufficient  amount  of  training  to 
make  him  an  effective  and  efficient  soldier ; 
that  this  has  served  to  benefit  and  uplift 
the  people  is  conclusively  shown  by  her  low 
criminal  rate,  which  is  only  a  fraction  of 
ours,  and  by  the  admitted  conservatism  of 


OF  THE  ARMY  65 

her  people,  their  law-abiding  habits,  their 
patriotism  and  their  respect  for  the  rights 
of  others.  Contrast  her  position  of  today 
with  that  of  another  small  European  coun- 
try, which,  unlike  her,  had  not  made  due 
preparation.  In  both  Switzerland  and 
Australia  a  large  amount  of  instruction  is 
given  through  public  schools  or  during  the 
school  period  of  the  youth — so  much,  in- 
deed, that  only  two  or  three  months  of  in- 
tensive training  in  camp  are  necessary  to 
complete  the  training  of  the  soldier.  The 
officers  take  a  longer  and  more  intensive 
course,  but  the  system  in  both  countries  is 
worked  out  so  that  there  is  practically  no 
interference  with  the  industrial  or  educa- 
tional careers  of  those  under  training. 

As  I  have  said  before,  there  has  been 
little  or  no  interest  in  this  country  in  this 
great  question  of  military  training.  There 
has  been  a  general  haphazard  policy  and 
a  blind  dependence  upon  volunteers;  in 


66  CIVIL  OBLIGATION 

other  words,  a  dependence  upon  someone 
else  doing  one's  work.  It  is  an  illogical 
system.  There  is  no  reason  why  one  group 
of  the  population  should  assume  that  an- 
other group  is  going  to  voluntarily  per- 
form their  military  duties.  The  obliga- 
tion to  military  service  is  universal.  It  is 
a  tax  upon  which  all  others  depend,  and  a 
nation  which  fails  to  recognize  this  pre- 
pares its  own  downfall.  This  general 
training  can  all  be  effected  as  has  been 
done  in  Switzerland  and  Australia,  with- 
out a  trace  of  militarism,  without  any 
departure  from  ideals,  and  with  a  great 
resulting  improvement  in  the  morals, 
physique  and  character  of  our  youth.  In 
Switzerland  and  Australia  the  training  of 
young  boys  is  principally  of  a  calisthenic 
character.  Later  they  pass  to  rifle  shoot- 
ing and  military  formations.  The  final 
finish  is  put  upon  them  in  training  at  the 
camps  which  immediately  precede  their 


OF  THE  ARMY  67 

entry  into  the  first  line  of  the  country's 
defense. 

You  must  not  think  that  war  is  one 
bf  the  great  destroyers  of  human  life. 
It  does  take  many  lives,  but  it  is  among  the 
lesser  causes  of  loss  of  life.  Our  indus- 
trial casualties,  not  deaths  necessarily,  but 
casualties  of  all  kinds,  amount  to  some- 
thing over  450,000  a  year.  Of  these,  about 
78,000  or  79,000  result  fatally — a  loss 
rather  exceeding  the  average  loss  of  life  of 
two  years  of  the  Civil  War.  Most  of  these 
accidents  are  preventable.  The  public  in- 
terest in  life  saving  is  not  sufficiently  keen 
to  insist  on  adequate  legislation  to  this 
end.  The  losses  in  the  war  are  more 
dramatic,  more  startling,  but  the  lives  lost 
in  every  day  work  in  the  struggle  for  exist- 
ence exceed  them  vastly  in  number  and  run 
on  without  ceasing,  both  during  peace  and 
war. 

The  following  is  a  little  illustration  of 


68  CIVIL  OBLIGATION 

the  case  of  our  own  country,  namely,  in 
ten  peaceful  Fourths  of  July  (the  last 
July  4,  1910),  approximately  1,800  per- 
sons were  killed  and  something  over  35,000 
wounded  in  celebrating  the  success  of  a 
war  which  ended  nearly  130  years  before. 
The  number  killed  equals  the  number 
killed  in  battle  or  who  died  of  wounds  in 
the  Spanish-American  War,  the  Philip- 
pine rebellion  and  the  Indian  wars  of  a 
number  of  years  preceding.  The  wounded 
of  these  ten  peaceful  days  aggregate  seven 
and  a  half  times  the  wounded  of  all  these 
wars.  I  tell  you  these  things  not  to  prove 
that  war  is  any  less  dreadful,  or  that  you 
should  strive  less  to  avoid  it,  but  simply  to 
present  to  you  the  truth  with  reference  to 
the  causes  which  bring  about  loss  of  life. 
Do  not  give  up  your  ideals.  Strive  for 
universal  peace,  but  while  striving  do  not 
forget  the  conditions  under  which  you  are 
living,  and,  however  much  you  may  hope 


OF  THE  ARMY  69 

to  obtain  a  condition  of  world  peace,  re- 
member that  there  is  no  evidence  of  it  to- 
day and  that  if  we  want  to  preserve  the 
institutions  which  have  been  handed  down 
to  us  we  must  be  ready  to  defend  them  or, 
as  Lord  Roberts  said: 

"Strive  to  stir  up,  to  foster  and  develop 
the  manly  and  more  patriotic  spirit  in  the 
nation — a  spirit  which  will  induce  our 
youth  to  realize  that  they  must  be  not  only 
ready  but  prepared  to  guard  the  heritage 
handed  down  to  them." 

Abandon  the  theory  of  chance  and  adopt 
that  of  probability  in  making  wise  provi- 
sions for  peace  through  preparedness  for 
war. 

You  hear  a  great  deal  about  the  destruc- 
tive work  of  the  soldier.  I  am  going  to 
say  just  a  word  with  reference  to  his  con- 
structive and  life  saving  work,  which  has 
really  been  his  principal  function  since  the 
close  of  the  Spanish- American  War,  and 


70  CIVIL  OBLIGATION 

indeed  it  was  one  of  his  principal  activities 
during  that  war.  Starting  with  Porto 
Rico,  we  find  that,  principally  due  to  the 
efforts  of  a  medical  officer  of  the  army,  Dr. 
Bailey  K.  Ashford,  tropical  anemia,  or 
hookworm  disease,  as  it  is  ordinarily  called, 
has  been  about  eliminated.  Not  only  was 
this  discovery  of  value  in  Porto  Rico,  but  it 
was  made  use  of  throughout  our  own 
southern  states,  with  a  result  of  revitaliz- 
ing and  reenergizing  hundreds  of  thous- 
ands of  people  afflicted  with  this  disease. 
The  annual  death  rate  in  Porto  Rico  alone 
was  reduced  by  a  number  exceeding  the 
total  number  of  men  killed  during  the 
Spanish- American  War,  and  a  recent  in- 
quiry made  of  all  planters  in  the  island 
with  reference  to  their  workers  indicates 
that,  in  their  opinion,  the  average  increase 
in  efficiency  is  60  per  cent — &  truly  start- 
ling figure,  and  one  which  illustrates  very 
well  the  far-reaching  and  wonderful  effects 


OF  THE  ARMY  71 

of   sanitary   measures   and   preventative 
medicine. 

Passing  on  to  Cuba,  here  we  have  the 
wonderful  discovery  of  Major  Walter 
Reed  and  his  associates,  Carroll  and 
Lezear,  which  resulted  in  discovering  the 
method  of  transmission  of  yellow  fever 
and  the  means  of  controlling  it,  and  the 
eventual  elimination  of  that  dread  disease 
not  only  from  Cuba,  but  from  all  the 
American  troops,  with  the  resulting  sav- 
ing in  life,  which  runs  into  many  thous- 
ands each  year,  and  a  saving  in  money  so 
vast  that  it  is  difficult  to  estimate  it;  for 
the  days  of  yellow  fever,  with  the  conse- 
quent quarantine,  which  tied  up  the  move- 
ment of  men  and  materials  throughout 
the  entire  South,  limited  the  movements 
of  ships  coming  from  yellow  fever  coun- 
tries, and  the  costly  disinfection,  resulted 
in  an  expenditure  running  into  hundreds 
of  millions.  Indeed,  it  is  safe  to  say  that 


72  CIVIL  OBLIGATION 

the  saving  from  yellow  fever  alone  every 
year  in  life  and  money  has  exceeded  the 
cost  in  each  of  the  Spanish- American  War 
and  the  Philippine  rebellion. 

In  the  Philippines  splendid  sanitary 
work  has  been  done  by  the  army  and  later 
by  the  civil  government.  Berri  berri,  one 
of  the  most  dreaded  of  the  eastern  diseases, 
has  been  done  away  with.  Malaria  has 
been  brought  under  control.  Infant  mor- 
tality has  been  halved.  Most  of  this  latter 
work  has  been  done  under  the  civil  govern- 
ment, but  the  foundations  were  laid  by  the 
medical  officers  of  the  army  who  at  first 
had  charge  of  the  work.  In  Panama  we 
see  the  direct  effect  of  this  work  in  the 
completion  of  the  Panama  Canal.  This 
great  and  splendid  piece  of  engineering, 
remarkable  as  it  is  from  an  engineering 
standpoint,  and  conducted  with  wonderful 
efficiency  by  General  Goethals  and  his  as- 
sistants, could  not  have  been  built  had  it 


OF  THE  ARMY  73 

not  been  for  the  application  by  General 
Gorgas  of  the  results  of  the  sanitary  dis- 
coveries made  in  Cuba  which  made  it  pos- 
sible to  carry  on  this  great  work  under 
conditions  of  health  which  equalled  those 
anywhere  in  the  United  States.  It  may  be 
truly  said  without  taking  one  atom  of 
credit  from  the  engineers  that  this  great 
work  was  built  on  a  sanitary  foundation. 
Had  we  not  got  rid  of  yellow  fever  and 
learned  to  control  malaria,  the  death  rate 
would  have  been  so  heavy  that  the  work 
could  only  have  resulted  in  our  hands  as 
it  did  in  the  hands  of  the  French,  for  noth- 
ing demoralizes  working  forces  more 
effectively  than  great  epidemics.  They 
are  worse  than  battles  in  some  ways. 

The  mobilization  on  the  Mexican  fron- 
tier has  not  been  without  its  great  and 
lasting  benefits.  It  enabled  us,  because  of 
the  prevalence  of  typhoid  in  the  Mexican 
villages  and  along  the  Rio  Grande,  to  in- 


74  CIVIL  OBLIGATION 

sist  upon  general  typhoid  inoculation  of 
officers  and  men,  and  the  result  has  been 
the  removal  of  typhoid  from  the  army. 
Last  year  there  were  100,000  men  scat- 
tered from  Tientsin  to  Panama,  through 
the  Hawaiian  Islands  and  the  Philippines, 
from  Alaska  to  Porto  Rico,  as  well  as 
all  over  the  United  States,  and  there  was 
not  a  single  death  among  them  from 
typhoid.  When  one  remembers  thous- 
ands of  cases  in  the  camps  of  the  Spanish- 
American  War,  the  importance  of  this 
discovery  is  appreciated.  The  general 
application  was  made  possible  only  by  the 
mobilization  of  troops  and  in  the  strug- 
gle to  protect  them.  So  it  was  with  the 
discovery  concerning  yellow  fever  and  the 
elaboration  of  the  methods  employed  in 
controlling  malaria.  The  results  of  these 
discoveries  are  now  all  of  general  appli- 
cation, not  only  to  the  population  in  our 
own  country,  but  to  the  population  of  all 


OF  THE  ARMY  75 

countries  in  and  bordering  on  the  Ameri- 
can tropics,  as  well  as  in  the  insular  pos- 
sessions. Not  only  were  great  sanitary 
results  secured  through  the  military  arms 
of  the  government,  but  it  should  be  remem- 
bered also  that  it,  the  military  arm, 
established  and  maintained  a  civil  govern- 
ment in  Porto  Rico,  Cuba  and  the  Philip- 
pines, and  conducted  these  governments 
with  great  success — in  Cuba  up  to  the 
point  of  the  transfer  to  the  Cuban  people 
of  a  completely  organized  republic,  and  in 
Porto  Rico  until  the  transfer  to  the  Amer- 
ican civil  government;  likewise  in  the 
Philippines  the  military  authorities  were 
in  full  charge  during  the  most  trying  per- 
iod and  turned  over  to  the  civil  commission 
which  followed  them  a  well-organized 
government  and  a  well-filled  treasury. 

I  tell  you  all  this  in  order  that  you  may 
understand  more  fully  what  the  real  work 
of  the  army  has  been — that  its  life  saving 


76  CIVIL  OBLIGATION 

has  counterbalanced  scores  of  times  its 
work  as  a  destructive  force,  if  one  may 
apply  the  term  "destructive  forces"  to  a 
force  used  to  terminate  intolerable  condi- 
tions and  to  establish  humane,  just  and 
equitable  governments  among  dependent 
people. 


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